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Abstract
This paper evaluates a youth internship program in Yemen. We examine the demand
for the program and find an oversupply of graduates in science, technology,
engineering, and mathematics and a relative undersupply of graduates in marketing
and business. Conditional on the types of graduates firms were looking to hire,
applicants were then randomly chosen for the program. Receiving an internship
resulted in an almost doubling of work experience in 2014 and a 73 % increase in
income. A follow-up survey shows that internship recipients had better employment
outcomes than the control group in the first 5 months after the program.
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1 Introduction
Youth unemployment is a global problem, and it is particularly high among educated
youth in the Middle East and North Africa (World Bank, 2014). Youth often face a
catch-22 whereby firms are reluctant to hire them without job experience unless they
have the right connections, but without being hired, they cannot get this experience.
The returns to this experience are believed to be high because initial jobs provide on-
the-job training for youth in both job-specific skills as well as in soft skills. But since
many young people may leave a firm once they have received this experience, there is
a concern that firms underprovide job experience from a public policy perspective.
Firms may be particularly reluctant to invest in training workers in fragile and
conflict-affected states, where political and economic uncertainty makes many types
of investments additionally risky (Blattman and Ralston, 2015).
This paper reports on a randomized experiment testing, an internship program in
the Republic of Yemen that was intended to help overcome these constraints and pro-
vide employment experience to educated youth. The program provided firms with a
50 % subsidy towards the cost of employing an intern for 6 months and a matchmak-
ing service to link firms seeking intern positions to graduates looking for employment
opportunities. The first year of this program took place in 2014, with a second year of
the program canceled due to civil conflict breaking out in the country in 2015.
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Evaluating the first year, we have four main findings. First, there appears to be a
mismatch between the supply of skills of interns (heavily concentrated in Science,
Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) fields like engineering and IT)
and the demand for these skills from firms (which required relatively more market-
ing and business graduates). Second, the internship program did generate new job
experience rather than just substituting for the employment applicants would have
received any way. We find recipients of the internship had a 42 percentage point
increase in the likelihood of working during the internship period, a 3.4-month in-
crease in the amount worked, and a 73 % increase in earnings during 2015. Third,
we were able to field a short-term post-treatment follow-up survey just as conflict
was starting, providing evidence on impacts up to 5 months after the internship.
The results show that the internship does appear to have also improved employ-
ment outcomes in this post-treatment period. However, we are unable to assess
whether this employment came at the expense of other youth in the country. Fi-
nally, we examine heterogeneity in impacts by gender. Statistical power for this
comparison is low, but the results show that in the absence of the program, female
applicants are less likely to work than males and that, if anything, the internship
has more impact for males and so does not close this gender gap.
This paper contributes to a broader literature on the impacts of labor programs on em-
ployment in developing countries. Blattman and Ralston (2015) provide a recent review
and note that it has been hard to find skills training programs that pass a cost-benefit test.
To our knowledge, this is the first randomized experiment to examine the impact of just
an internship program in a developing country, despite such programs being used by a
number of governments.1 In related work, Card et al. (2011) and Attanasio et al. (2011)
provide results from experiments in the Dominican Republic and Colombia, respectively,
that included 3 months of vocational training followed by 2- to 3-month internships, find-
ing no increase in employment in the Dominican Republic and a 7 % increase for women
in Colombia (but no increase for men)—with it being unclear how much of this effect
comes from the vocational training compared to the internship components. Another
strand of related literature provides wage subsidies to job-seekers that they can take to
firms (Galasso et al., 2004; Groh et al. forthcoming; Levinsohn et al, 2013). Only in the
Jordan case studied by Groh et al. (forthcoming) were these subsidies actually redeemed
by firms, and they find no significant post-program impacts on youth employment. The
key difference with the type of internship program studied in this paper is that it is
demand-driven, seeking to match applicants to jobs that firms are actively interested in
filling.2 In addition, it provides evidence from a poorer and more conflict-afflicted setting
than these existing studies.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the country
context and details of the internship program. Section 3 compares the supply of and
demand for interns. Section 4 discusses the intern selection process, the randomization
procedure, take-up, and data collection. Section 5 provides the results, and Section 6
concludes.
2 Context and program details
The Republic of Yemen is the poorest country in the Arab world, with a per-capita
GDP of US$1473 (2013), more than half the population living below the poverty line,
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and a ranking of 154 of 187 countries in the Human Development Index (2011). In the
2 years preceding the launch of the program studied here, the Republic of Yemen had
undergone a revolution as part of the Arab Spring, marked by protests, armed clashes,
and a contraction of the economy. In this environment, young graduates faced even
more than the usual difficulties finding jobs. In common with elsewhere in the region,
unemployment rates were estimated to be higher for educated youth relative to less
skilled youth, and the female wage employment in non-agricultural sectors rate of 12 %
is the lowest in the world.
2.1 Internship program
The Enterprise Revitalization and Employment Pilot (EREP) was designed as a 2-year
pilot project to help firms and recent graduates seeking jobs. The internship compo-
nent of this project aimed to place 400 Yemeni youth into internship jobs with firms in
Yemen, 200 in the first year and 200 in the second year, with each year the number
equally divided between the two main cities of Sanaa and Aden. These internships were
funded through matching grants to firms applying to the program in which the pro-
gram would pay half the costs of the internship (for up to 6 months) and the firm the
other half. The program would also facilitate the process of firms finding these workers
through having recent graduates apply to the program, providing a short basic skills
training course to them, and providing a matchmaking process to match these appli-
cants to positions operated by firms. To be eligible for an internship through the pro-
gram, individuals had to be Yemeni, live in either Sanaa or Aden, and have graduated
from university or a vocational school in the past 2 years.
2.2 Program launch
The program was launched in August 2013 by the Small and Micro Enterprise Promotion
Service (SMEPS). This occurred through a project website, media events (tv, radio, and
newspaper), Facebook and Google Ads, workshops at universities, vocational schools, and
business associations. Applicants had to fill out an online application between October 1,
2013, and December 26, 2013 (see timeline in Appendix 1). The application form included
contact information, schooling and field of study, work experience, and the type of work
the applicant was interested in. The data from these applications form the key baseline in-
formation for our study. Applications by youth were then subject to a simple screening
process to ensure they met the eligibility criteria. The screening process started on De-
cember 29, 2013, and finished on January 5, 2014. At the end of this process, SMEPS had
a total of 3487 eligible applicants interested in undertaking an internship.
2.3 Conflict resumes
The first year of the program took part in 2014, with internships taking place as described
below. However, in August 2014, halfway through these internships, Houthi rebels began
demonstrations in Sanaa against increased fuel prices, and in September, they took control
of the city of Sanaa. A U.N.-brokered peace agreement was made in which they agreed to
withdraw once a national unity government was formed. The situation worsened at the
start of 2015, with the Houthis seizing control of the state television station, President
Hadi resigning and fleeing to Aden, and conflict involving competing Yemeni factions and
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regional powers breaking out in late March and early April 2015. As a result of these
events, the second year of the program was canceled, and as a result, this analysis focuses
on the first year of the program.
3 The supply of, and demand for, interns
We examine the characteristics of who applied for internship jobs and then compare
this to the types of jobs that firms were looking for to examine where there was a mis-
match between supply and demand for skills and to characterize the participants in the
program.
3.1 The supply of interns
Column 1 of Table 1 provides some basic characteristics of the 3487 youth applying to
the program. The mean and median age of the applicants is 26, with 90 % being be-
tween 23 and 30. Thirty percent of the applicants were female, and 47 % are from Aden
(with the rest in Sanaa). The majority have a university education rather than just voca-
tional training, and 82 % claim to be able to use a computer, although only half of that
have more advanced computer skills in terms of knowledge of specific software like
CAD, Excel, Photoshop, or others. The most common specializations based on the
studies individuals have undertaken are engineering and information technology (43 %)
and business (27 %).
The first six columns of Table 2 examine the potential supply of interns in more de-
tail, breaking down the specializations by gender and city. We see that males and fe-
males are equally likely to have taken business majors, whereas males are more likely
than females to be engineering and information technology majors and less likely to be
English or teaching majors. These gender differences occur in both cities, and in
Table 1 Baseline characteristics
All applicants Control group Treatment group p value Take-up group
Female 0.30 0.31 0.26 0.154 0.25
Located in Aden 0.47 0.35 0.51 s 0.51
Age 26.2 25.8 26.2 0.211 25.9
Has university education 0.71 0.68 0.70 0.559 0.63
Can use a computer 0.82 0.92 0.92 0.819 0.90
More advanced computer skills 0.48 0.34 0.36 0.215 0.35
English skills (1 to 5 scale,
1 best)
2.86 2.82 2.85 0.994 2.97
Has a driver’s license 0.24 0.26 0.29 0.681 0.30
Is a business major 0.27 0.48 0.51 s 0.51
Is an engineering or IT major 0.43 0.25 0.25 s 0.23
Accounting specialization 0.13 0.13 0.14 s 0.11
Business specialization 0.06 0.30 0.28 s 0.31
Marketing specialization 0.01 0.03 0.07 s 0.07
English specialization 0.06 0.10 0.09 s 0.09
Sample size 3487 153 430 158
Notes: s denotes variables used in stratified randomization. p values are from regression test of difference in means,
controlling for stratification dummies
McKenzie et al. IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2016) 5:1 Page 4 of 15
general, the supply of potential interns does not exhibit large differences across the two
cities in terms of specialization.
3.2 The demand for interns
The remaining three columns of Table 2 show the demand for interns according to their
specialization for the internship positions that were actually filled.3 Forty-five percent of
all interns demanded were in positions that required a major in business. This included
marketing, accounting, and general business administration. Twenty-five percent were in
engineering and information technology and 30 % in other fields such as English and
medical fields.
Comparing the potential supply of interns from the applicants to the program, and
the demand in terms of positions filled, we see some mismatches between supply and
demand. In particular, there appears to be an excess supply of graduates in the STEM
fields of engineering and information technology and an under-supply in business
fields. In particular, marketing and business administration constitute more than four
times the proportion of positions demanded as they do of potential supply, while civil
engineers and information technology majors constitute less than a fifth of the propor-
tion of positions demanded as they do of potential supply.
This mismatch of supply and demand in part reflects the volatile political and secur-
ity situation in Yemen. In this environment, the construction sector had halted a lot of
activity, reducing the demand for engineers, whereas the retail sector was less affected
and still had demand for graduates to help them run their businesses and sell their
Table 2 The supply of interns by gender and city and demand by city
Supply of potential interns Demand for interns
All applicants Sanaa Aden
Male Female Male Female Male Female All Sanaa Aden
All business specializations 0.27 0.28 0.25 0.18 0.30 0.35 0.45 0.44 0.45
Business administration 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.25 0.28 0.24
Accounting 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.05 0.14 0.15 0.09 0.09 0.09
Marketing 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.07
Management 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.04
All engineering/IT 0.46 0.34 0.50 0.37 0.42 0.32 0.24 0.26 0.23
Communications
engineer
0.06 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.02
Computer engineer 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.05
Civil engineer 0.09 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02
Telecoms engineer 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.02
Computer programmer 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02
Information technology 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.06 0.11 0.02 0.02 0.02
All other specializations 0.26 0.38 0.25 0.45 0.28 0.33 0.31 0.30 0.32
English 0.04 0.13 0.05 0.19 0.02 0.08 0.07 0.14 0.02
Medicine 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.11
Teaching 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.00
Sample size 2453 1034 1440 420 1013 614 197 87 110
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products. However, it also reflects more structural factors in an economy with a weak
manufacturing base and limited ICT sector.
4 The intern selection process, randomization, take-up, and data collection
After firms had indicated their demand for interns, these jobs were mapped to specializa-
tions of study. For some positions, there was a single specialization that was relevant (e.g.,
a firm requesting interns for a dentistry position had this job mapped just to applicants
who had studied dentistry), while for others, several specializations were considered suit-
able (e.g., for firms requiring interns in business administration positions, the specializa-
tions of business administration, office management, and management were all
considered suitable). Based on this potential demand, SMEPS randomly chose a sample of
500 applicants with probability proportion to demand.
These 500 applicants were invited to attend a 2-day basic skills training which occurred
in February 2014 in Sanaa and March 2014 in Aden. Four hundred seventy-seven of the
500 invited attended. The course covered interview skills, basic time management skills,
and instructions for key work behaviors. Training was provided by SEEDS in Sanaa and
Mothabroom in Aden. Both are institutions specializing in offering skills development
courses, English courses, and entrepreneurship courses.
4.1 Randomization process
The 500 applicants invited to the 2-day training were randomly assigned to treatment
and control groups. Random assignment effectively occurred within strata defined by
specialization and city. In all, there are 231 such strata, but many of these contain few
individuals in specializations with no market demand, so only 39 strata were used.
The selection algorithm proceeded as follows: First, each job was mapped to the set
of suitable specializations. Then for each type of position (e.g., business administration
positions in Sanaa), the aim was to allocate randomly the pool of applicants invited to
training to treatment and control with a 1.5:1 ratio. More individuals were to be allo-
cated to treatment than control to give firms a choice of candidates to choose among.
However, for some positions, there were insufficient graduates to pursue this strategy.
These positions were then mapped to secondary and tertiary specializations. The selec-
tion procedure would then choose anyone with the primary specialization for treatment
with certainty, before then randomly selecting from secondary and tertiary specializa-
tions. The individuals chosen with certainty then would be part of the program, but
not part of the experimental sample. Finally, additional individuals who had not gone
through the 2-day training were randomly selected to boost numbers for some posi-
tions. Randomization was done internally at SMEPS using Excel.
The resulting experimental sample consists of 583 youth, of which 430 (318 males,
112 females) were allocated to treatment and 153 (105 males, 48 females) to control.
The second and third columns of Table 2 provide summary statistics for these groups.
Note that the probability of being treated varies across strata, ranging from 37.5 to
96.6 %. As such, a simple comparison of means shows some differences between the
two groups. For example, 7 % of the treatment group are marketing graduates com-
pared to 3 % of the control group, reflecting the shortage of marketing graduates so
that these individuals had a higher chance of being allocated to treatment.
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To account for this randomization within strata, our analysis will follow the recom-
mendation of Bruhn and McKenzie (2009) and condition on strata (specialization*city)
fixed effects. To estimate the impact of being assigned to the internship treatment
group on outcome Y, we will then estimate
Y i ¼ bTi þ
X39
S¼1δSI i∈Sð Þ þ εi; ð1Þ
where T denotes assignment to the internship treatment, and I(i∈s) is a dummy variable
which takes value 1 if individual i is in strata s and 0 otherwise. Column 4 of Table 1
reports the p value for testing if the treatment effect is 0 (i.e., the groups are balanced)
through estimating Eq. (1) on our baseline variables. It shows that the treatment and
control group are balanced on key characteristics like gender, age, and education after this
correction.
Note that the standard stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) assumes here
that the outcomes for the control group are unaffected by those being treated. This assump-
tion would be violated if the control group and treatment group were directly competing
for the same jobs. Given our sample is small relative to both the number of job openings
and job-seekers in the economy, we believe the chance that treated youth are directly com-
peting with the control group for specific job openings is rather small and therefore that the
SUTVA should be satisfied to a first order. Note that it could however still be the case that
the job opportunities to the treated come at the expense of other youth in the economy
(outside our experimental sample). As a result, the treatment effect will produce only the
partial equilibrium effect of giving some youth additional experience and not the general
equilibrium effect of what would happen if all youth took part in internships.
4.2 Matchmaking and take-up
Eleven human resource advisors were recruited by the program to help match individ-
uals in the treatment group to firms seeking jobs. The advisors talked with the firms to
check which qualities they were seeking in workers, and then, they called and pre-
screened youth in the treatment group to identify a set of individuals that matched the
firm’s criteria. The CVs and details of these candidates were then sent to firms, and
firms invited youth to interviews and decided whether or not to make them an intern-
ship offer. If an individual in the treatment group was not selected by a firm, they went
back into the pool of available treatment group individuals that the advisor could then
attempt to match to another job.
In total, 334 interviews took place, and 198 interns were accepted by firms into
jobs.4 Some of these were accepted with certainty due to insufficient numbers to also
allow a control group, and so were not part of the experimental sample. In total, 158
of the 430 individuals in the experimental treatment group received an internship
(36.7 %). The take-up rate did not differ significantly by gender (34.8 % for females,
37.4 % for males, p value for test of equality is 0.625).
There were three main reasons why some individuals assigned to the internship treat-
ment group did not receive an internship. First, by design, there were more individuals
assigned to treatment than there were internship jobs available in order that firms
could be offered several candidates to interview and find a good fit. Second, some of
the youth assigned to the internship program dropped out either because they found a
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job without the internship, because they could not be reached, or because of other
circumstances. Third, some of the firms that had been selected to receive matching
grants for interns dropped out of the program. This resulted because several months
had passed since they had applied, and either they had recruited directly from the mar-
ket during this time or had decided as a result of the changing economic situation that
they could no longer afford to offer this position. When this happened, SMEPS
attempted to replace the firm with another firm requesting graduates from the same
specialization in the same city, but in some cases, this was not possible, and as a result,
some of individuals assigned to treatment would be in specializations where there was
no longer any demand for them.
4.3 Data collection
We use three main sources of data. The first consists of baseline information available
from the applications. The second consists of administrative data from the program,
which provides key information on initial take-up of the internship and internship
completion rates. The third and main source of data comes from a follow-up survey.
We had originally planned surveys at 6 and 12 months after the end of the internship.
However, with the worsening situation in Yemen, we quickly launched a follow-up sur-
vey in March 2015. This timing took place 3–6 months after the end of the internships
and right before civil conflict broke out. The survey was conducted as a phone survey
given that safety issues, gas shortages, and time constraints prohibited an in-person
survey. The survey was conducted by Apex consulting and had a response rate of
78.7 % (78.1 % treatment, 80.4 % control, p value of test of equality 0.666). We believe
this response rate to be excellent given the difficult conditions, and given there is no
statistical difference in response rates by treatment group, we assume attrition is at ran-
dom for the purposes of analysis.
The survey asked questions about employment during 2014 to capture the time of
the internship and then questions about employment in the months of December 2014
and February 2015 to capture post-treatment employment outcomes.
5 Results
We begin with descriptive information on what took place during the internships,
followed by analysis of the impact of these internships on employment outcomes.
5.1 What did an internship entail?
The modal intern worked 6 months as an intern. According to the administrative data,
59 of the 198 interns placed did not work the full 6 months because either the firm de-
cided to no longer retain them or they decided to leave. In the follow-up survey, 64 %
worked in the internship position for 6 months, while 24 % worked for 3 months or
less.
Interns were typically working around 40 h per week, Sunday to Thursday. The jobs
appear very similar in terms of what they entailed to the types of jobs the control group
was doing. Table 3 uses the survey data to compare the different characteristics of work
for those who worked in the treatment group in 2014 to those who worked in the
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0.333 (0.464) −1376 (5770) −314 (3613) 0.069
(0.046)
0.023 (0.060) 0.040 (0.054) 0.069 (0.056) 0.069 (0.059) −0.035 (0.058) 0.020 (0.070)
Sample size 336 335 335 336 336 336 336 336 336 336
Control
mean
6.400 59,442 55,975 0.853 0.707 0.787 0.773 0.747 0.747 0.573
















control group. This conditions on working at all (the next subsection examines the
treatment effect on work).
We see that the two groups are statistically similar in terms of the characteristics of
their jobs conditional on working. The jobs pay an average of 55,000–59,000 rials per
month (approximately US$255–270). They are mostly with private employers, in jobs
related to the studies of the intern. In at least 80 % of the cases, the intern says the job
involves using a computer that they learned technical skills on the job and that they
learned organizational skills on the job. However, as with jobs taken by the control
group, three-quarters of the interns also say that they spent at least 2 h per day on
tasks they considered beneath them and 59 % were idle at the job at least 5 h or more
per week. The internships therefore appear to have involved the same mix of learning
opportunities and less learning oriented activities as a typical job for this group.
5.2 Impact of internship on employment during the internship period
In order for the internship program to increase employment, it must result in additional
employment for the applicants rather than just substituting for jobs they would have
found anyway. To estimate the impact of being assigned to the internship treatment on
employment (the intention-to-treat effect or ITT), we estimate Eq. (1) for several employ-
ment outcomes. We then also estimate the impact of actually taking up the internship
(the local average treatment effect or LATE) by instrumenting take-up of an internship
with the random assignment.
Table 4 then reports the impact of the internship treatment on employment out-
comes during 2014. Column 1 looks at whether the applicant worked at all in 2014.
Only 61 % of the control group were able to find work. Being assigned to the treatment
group increased this probability by a statistically significant 17 % age points and actu-
ally receiving the internship by 42 percentage points. Column 2 shows the program also
led to a significant increase in the number of months of work done in 2014: the control
group worked an average of 3.9 months of the year (including zeros for those who did
not work) and the effect of taking up the internship is to almost double this amount of
work experience (increasing it by 3.4 months). Columns 3 and 4 show that the program
also increased the amount the applicants earned in 2014, with the LATE effect of
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Sample size 459 459 458 458 459
Control mean 0.610 3.902 36,245 34,131 −0.213
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, after controlling for strata fixed effects. *, **, and *** indicate significance
at the 10, 5, and 1 % levels, respectively. Truncated earnings truncate at the 99th percentile
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24,800 rials representing a 73 % increase in earnings relative to those of the control
group. The final column pools these different indicators together as an aggregate index
of standardized z-scores and finds a significant impact on employment using this
measure.
Table 5 examines the heterogeneity in impact by gender. Since we have only 1 year of
the program rather than the originally planned two, statistical power is lower than
planned. We see that female applicants are less likely to work at all, work fewer
months, and earn less than male applicants among the control group. The program is
found to have statistically significant impacts for male applicants. All the treatment in-
teractions suggest that the program was less effective for female applicants, but due to
the relatively small sample size, we cannot reject equality of treatment effects by
gender.
5.3 Post-treatment impact
We then turn to examining whether the added work experience gained during this in-
ternship has impact that last beyond the end of the internship. Recall that due to the
outbreak of civil conflict in Yemen, our survey had to be fielded earlier than planned,
making these relatively short-term post-treatment outcomes. The survey elicited infor-
mation on work in December 2014 and February 2015. December 2014 is 1 to 3 months
after the end of the internship, while February 2015 is 3 to 5 months after, but during a
period where the Houthis had taken over the government in Sanaa.
Table 6 reports the results. When we consider each employment outcome separately,
the point estimates are all positive, but only the impact on hours worked per week in
February 2015 is significant at the 10 % level. However, when we aggregate the outcomes
together into a standardized employment outcome index (again defined as the average of
standardized z-scores), the internship has a positive effect which is significant at the 1 %
level. The impact is relatively large in magnitude, with the ITT representing a 0.35 stand-
ard deviation increase in the index and the LATE a 0.85 standard deviation increase. An-
other potential approach to increasing power is to pool together the two measurements
and estimate the average impact in a panel setting, as in McKenzie (2012). Appendix 2































Sample size 459 459 458 458 459
Control mean,
males
0.627 4.084 42,169 39,036 −0.139
Control mean,
females
0.575 3.525 23,953 23 953 −0.369
Notes: Robust standard error in parentheses, after controlling for strata fixed effects. *, **, and *** indicate significance at
the 10, 5, and 1 % levels, respectively. Truncated earnings truncate at the 99th percentage
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reports these results, which show the treatment group working a statistically significant
4.7 h more per week than the control group and positive, but not statistically significant
impacts on working at all and on income earned.
Table 7 examines the heterogeneity in post-treatment employment impacts by gender.
The results show females in the control group continuing to have lower employment rates
and earning lower income than males. As with the results in Table 5, power is low, but
the point estimates suggest the treatment impacts were larger for male youth than
females, so the internship program is not helping close this gender gap.
6 Conclusions
The internship program succeeded in generating new job experience for applicants in a
context of worsening political and economic instability in Yemen. The internship jobs ap-
pear similar in terms of learning experiences to the jobs the control group managed to
get; just more people in the treatment group were able to experience them. The fact that
those who received internships had better employment outcomes after the end of the pro-
gram shows some post-program persistence in this effect.
The context also requires several caveats in interpreting these results. The civil con-
flict that erupted in 2015 resulted in the cancelation of the second year of the program,
effectively halving our intended sample size and reducing our statistical power. It also
required the follow-up survey to be conducted more quickly after the end of the pro-
gram that we had planned and for a shorter survey instrument to be used. Moreover,
the armed conflict in 2015 has resulted in large-scale internal displacement, with more
than 80 % of the population in need of humanitarian assistance, shortages of fuel, elec-
tricity, and water, and infrastructure damage (European Commission, 2015). As a re-
sult, employment opportunities for the population in this study are likely to have been
severely affected, potentially reducing any longer-term impact. Finally, it is possible
that the employment gains to the treated youth came at the expense of other youth in
the economy so that the general equilibrium impact of scaling-up such a program
could be less than the effect measured here. Nevertheless, we believe it important to
share the results available given the paucity of evidence on internship programs in de-
veloping countries.
Table 6 Impacts post-intervention
































































Sample size 459 459 459 459 452 454 452 454 459
Control mean 0.472 0.496 18.959 19.374 27,862 9538 27,862 9050 −0.213
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, after controlling for strata fixed effects. *, **, and *** indicate significance
at the 10, 5, and 1 % levels, respectively
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Table 7 Gender ITT impacts post-intervention
Worked at all Weekly hours Monthly income Truncated monthly income Overall employment index
Dec 2014 Feb 2015 Dec 2014 Feb 2015 Dec 2014 Feb 2015 Dec 2014 Feb 2015
Assigned to intern program 0.063 (0.064) 0.092 (0.067) 5.188 (3.362) 8.000** (3.585) 1364 (4684) 630 (3116) 662 (4626) 1353 (2554) 0.299*** (0.101)
Assigned to intern program*female −0.025 (0.121) −0.120 (0.120) −5.548 (5.636) −12.321** (5.853) 4115 (9898) −2823 (4798) 3670 (8673) −3708 (4304) −0.142 (0.182)
Female −0.098 (0.105) −0.055 (0.106) −6.230 (4.999) −3.256 (5.192) −15100** (7177) −4801 (4295) −15800** (6880) −3732 (3663) −0.264* (0.156)
Sample size 459 459 459 459 452 454 452 454 459
Control mean, males 0.494 0.506 19.988 20.325 32,110 10,630 32,110 9907 −0.139
Control mean, females 0.425 0.475 16.825 17.400 19,153 7273 19,153 7273 −0.369

















1For example, IEG (2012) notes the governments of Rwanda and Tunisia have subsi-
dized internships for university graduates but notes that the Tunisia program has been
costly and had low placement rates.
2Groh et al. (forthcoming) provide results from an experiment in Jordan that
attempted to match workers to firms without any subsidies, finding that providing the
matching service alone did not have any impact on employment.
3This does not include unmet demand from firms that applied but were not selected
for the program, as well as firms that requested interns but then dropped out of the
program. Data are not available on the specific fields requested for these firms.
4Table 2 shows data on 197 individuals, which is what our data indicate. Administra-
tive records show 198 in total were placed.
Appendix 1: Timeline
August 2013: program launched
October 1, 2013–December 26, 2013: online application process for interns
December 29, 2013–January 5, 2014: screening for eligibility
January 2014: random selection of potential interns for training
February–March 2014: 2-day basic skills training
March–May 2014: matching of treatment group interns to firms, and interviews by
firms
March–June 2014: start of internships
September 2014: Houthi rebels take control of the capital of Sanaa. UN peace deal
announced in which they agree to withdraw once national unity government is formed
August–December 2014: end of internships
January–February 2015: Houthis seize state TV; President Hadi resigns and flees to
Aden; Houthis take charge of the government
March 2015: follow-up survey conducted
March 2015: Islamic state carries out suicide bombings (March 20). Saudi-led coali-
tion launches air strikes and imposes naval blockade (March 26). Clashes in Aden and
other cities. By April, widespread conflict
Appendix 2: Pooled estimates













4.730** (2.361) 1950 (2350) 1776 (2243)
Feb 2015 dummy 0.015
(0.022)
0.231 (1.149) −23,400*** (2426) −22,300*** (1998)
Sample size 918 918 906 906
Control mean 0.484 19.167 18,663 18,418
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, after controlling for strata fixed effects and clustering at the individual
level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 % levels, respectively
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